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Tunisian and Turkish immigration 
in France 
A first important element that we have to take in 
account to contextualise flows of Tunisian migrants 
to France are the colonial ties connecting the 
two countries between 1881 and 1957, when the 
Tunisian Republic was officially declared. These 
links constitute a key factor in the development of 
migration flows between the two spaces. Tunisian 
migration flows to France are further linked to 
the two World Wars, and primarily World War II, 
in which the protectorate provided soldiers to the 
French army and workers for the industries, as well 
as labour force for the post-war periods. Thus, in 
comparison with the other Maghreb countries, such 
as Morocco or Algeria, Tunisian emigration flows to 
Europe appear later.
The two main periods of Tunisian migration to 
France come after the country gained independence 
in 1956, when the flow of Tunisians began to grow 
‘anarchically’ until the early 1960s. A second period 
follows the signature of the “Grandval” bilateral 
convention on 9 August 1963, which organised the 
recruitment and the stay of Tunisian workers in 
France. After this agreement, emigration flows are 
more structured by the Tunisian government, as well 
as by France. Between 1969, when the application 
of the agreement enter effectively in force, and 
1972 more then half of state-controlled Tunisian 
emigration was heading for France.
The oil crisis in the mid-1970s interrupted of formal 
recruitment, however in the wake of this disruption 
family reunifications increased, bringing new 
Tunisians – primarily women – to France. At the 
same time, irregular flows start to develop alongside 
a growing number of Tunisians overstaying their 
visas. These flows represent the main channels of 
entry of Tunisian population in the last decades.
In the case of Turkish migration to France, the start 
of formal flows begins with the bilateral agreement 
on labour recruitment signed between the two 
countries on 8 May 1965. This was designed to cover 
shortages in the French labour market that were not 
already being filled by immigrants from Spain, Italy 
and Portugal. In reality, only at the beginning of the 
1970s did the French National Bureau of Immigration 
(OFI) start signing collective recruitment contracts 
for Turkish workers, assigning them to industrial 
areas (Alsace, Vosges, Rhône-Alpes) and some rural 
areas (Auvergne and Limousin).
Family reunification replaced labour migration 
in 1974 as the main flow of Turkish migrants into 
France after the oil crisis interrupted the formal 
recruitment of foreign workers. One of the major 
effects of this shift was to increase the number of 
Turkish women in France.Is important to note here 
that Turkish migration flows to Europe developed 
later than those coming from the Maghreb. 
Of the Tunisian immigrants residing in France in 
2008, 25% had arrived at the end of the 1960s. In 
contrast, the arrival of Turkish migrant in France 
is more spread out over time. In general, Tunisian 
migrants arrived earlier than Turkish migrants. 
While the former mainly arrived between the 1970s 
and the 2000s, the latter largely arrived between the 
1980s and the 2000s.
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The policies 
The starting point of French integration policy can 
be placed after the suspension of the recruitment of 
foreign workers in July 1974. One consequence of 
stopping formal recruitment was the stabilisation 
of migrants already present in France, as well as the 
development of the family reunifications. At this 
moment, French state action was oriented more to 
the perspective of the return of immigrants than to 
their stable integration in France. 
Legislative activity on immigration was intense 
during the 1980s, especially in the areas of entrance 
and stay of foreigners, the conditions of citizenship 
eligibility, and the fight against discrimination. 
Following the passage of the ‘Bonnet’  law on 10 
January 1980 – which introduced deportation as a 
sanction for the illegal stay – this intense normative 
production made the legislative framework on 
immigration evermore complex. 
With the family reunifications and the stabilisation 
of immigrants in France, the policy perspective on 
foreign population in France changes progressively 
and integration appears more and more as an 
issue, even if indirectly. To understand the French 
approach to integration, it is important to note the 
‘assimilationist’ approach of integration policy, not 
targeting long-term immigrants as recipients of 
1 An updated list of multiple existing bilateral agreements is available on the site of the association GISTI. 
http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?rubrique135
Figure 1- Evolution of the number of foreigners, 1982-2011
Source: INSEE, Population selon la nationalité au 1er janvier 2011, and Étrangers par région au 1er janvier 2005; 
MPI Data Hub. 1960-2013
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specific integration measures. The key element for 
a good integration of the foreigners into the French 
society is to accept and respect the basic principles 
and values of the French republic.
The Interior Ministry puts forward two main tools 
in the field of the integration policy: the requirement 
of naturalization and the reception and integration 
contract. The first pillar of French integration policy 
is access to French citizenship. The acquisition of 
French citizenship by those who cannot claim it by 
either descent or birth depends for the most part on 
the Interior Minister in charge of naturalizations. 
The second pillar of the French integration policy 
is the Reception and Integration Contract (CAI), 
previewed by the Code of Entry and Stay of 
Foreigners and Rights of Asylum (CESEDA) of 2004, 
and compulsory since January 2007. In this frame
work, learning French represents a clear priority, 
and several measures have been implemented at the 
language level.  
All nationalities benefit from the same measures 
at the local and national level, and no immigrant 
community is targeted by any specific rules because 
of its nationality. Nonetheless, the regulation of 
entrance and stay, as well as of access to the labour 
market, is affected by bilateral agreements1. This can 
indirectly have consequences on the integration of 
migrants. 
Looking at pre-departure measures, the main 
existing tools towards integration are managed by 
the OFII, and include an evaluation measure and 
abroad training (prior to CAI). Those measures are 
mainly about language learning, and also concern 
the beneficiaries the family reunification or the 
spouse of a French citizen.
Looking at the policy and institutional framework of 
the two countries of origin analysed in the report, it is 
necessary to look comparatively at their emigration 
and diaspora policies, to underline their differences 
and similarity. 
The attitude of Tunisia vis-à-vis of the emigration 
of its citizens has changed over time. Looking at a 
first period of the emigration, between 1955 and 
1963, the government was generally opposed to 
emigration, due to the risk of losing skilled workers 
during the creation of a national economy post-
independence. After 1963, Tunisian authorities had 
to address unemployment on the national labour 
market as well as informal outflows of migrants. This 
led them to sign bilateral agreements with France 
(9 August 1963) and later on with other countries. 
Tunisia created an Office of Professional Formation 
and Employment (OFPE) in 1967, where a special 
DG on emigration has the mission to control, at each 
level, the growing emigration flows.
In general terms, the current Tunisian emigration 
policy tries to combine two different elements: 
sending some of its citizens overseas, as well as 
keeping strong ties between them and their origin 
country. Looking at recent times, it also has to be 
noted that the revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, which 
overthrew the former President Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali, changed the political landscape in the country 
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deeply, as well as the institutional structures and 
aims towards Tunisian emigrants.
In the case of Turkey, the policy framework  concerning 
emigration has also evolved in a  significant way 
through time. In the 1960s, in order to decrease 
unemployment and benefit from remittances as 
tools of development, the Turkish state promoted 
emigration through bilateral labour agreements 
signed with France (1965) and many other European 
countries. During this early stage of migration flows 
to Europe in the 1960s, the overall state emigration 
policy in Turkey was based on facilitating remittance 
flows and the easy return of labour migrants. 
Alarmed by the first signs of Turkish permanent 
settlement in Europe, the Turkish state started to 
taking measures for encouraging returns to Turkey. 
During the 1970s, various programs were initiated 
to channel workers’ remittances into employment 
generating investments. However, these initiatives 
did not live up to government expectations. In the 
1980s, Turkish permanent settlement in Europe was 
generally accepted. The economic mentality of the 
state emigration policy was slowly replaced with 
social, cultural and political measures for integration 
abroad. In the 1990s, the Turkish state began 
institutionalizing the monitoring and controlling the 
overseas populations. Starting from the 2000s, the 
state became actively involved by bringing together 
domestic institutions and representatives of Turks 
from a wider geography with the main aim to keep 
cultural ties.
An overview of the Turkish diaspora policy 
across time shows a policy shift from promoting 
return migration to keeping economic and social 
ties with emigrants. This continues with the 
institutionalization of monitoring and controlling 
the overseas populations, as well as the state’s 
active involvement with domestic institutions and 
representatives of Turks abroad.
Interpreting the integration index
The integration index elaborated about Tunisian 
and Turkish migrants in France shows differences 
between the two communities in the three 
fields considered (Table 1). In all the three fields 
analysedhere, the level of integration of Tunisian 
immigrants is higher than of Turkish immigrants. 
ORIGIN Labour Market Education Access to citizenship
Index Gap index Index Gap index Index
Tunisia 0.50 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.77
Turkey 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.41
Table 1 - Level of integration of Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants in Spain 
Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015); note: year of reference 2012, as for the following tables if not 
explicitly mentioned.
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In general terms, it is necessary to note that some 
of the dissimilarity in integration patterns has to be 
connected with the particular historical, linguistic 
and cultural links between Tunisia and France. Some 
other differences can be linked with the specific time 
evolution of the two migration flows to France. 
Looking at indicators on labour market, the pattern 
of Tunisians in the labour market is more close to 
that of French nationals than the Turkish pattern is.
The share of working-age Turkish migrants who are 
employed is only 40.4%, versus 51.7% of Tunisians 
and 64.8% of French. This low share of employed 
persons among Turkish migrants is due both to a 
very high number of inactive and unemployed people 
(respectively 44.3% and 15.3%) compared with both 
Tunisians (36.9% and 11.3%) and – to a large extent 
– to French people (28.7% and 6.6%). Concerning 
the employment type, Tunisians are more often 
self-employed then Turkish migrants (respectively 
20.3% and 15.2%), although both groups are more 
self-employed then French (only 10.7%). 
Concerning the employment of immigrants by 
sector, Tunisians are more employed in services 
sector than Turkish migrants, while the latter are 
more employed in manufacturing. In particular, the 
share of population employed in the manufacturing 
and service sectors show significant differences: 
22% of Tunisian and 23% of French are employed 
in manufacturing, versus 52% of Turkish; 77% 
of Tunisians and 76% of French are employed in 
services, versus only 46% of Turkish migrants.
Also looking at the type of occupation following 
the ISCO categories, data show that the pattern 
of Tunisians immigrants employed in higher 
occupations is higher than that of Turkish migrants, 
the majority of whom are employed in lower 
occupations, and is thus more close to the pattern of 
the French native population. The share of Turkish 
employees in higher occupations (ISCO categories 1, 
2 and 3) is only 14.3%, while the share of Tunisians is 
43% (for French population is 44%). To explain this 
difference it has to be considered that the share of 
tertiary-educated Tunisians in France is higher that 
that of Turks (respectively 18% of Tunisians, and 8% 
of Turkish immigrants), and that Tunisians have a 
higher familiarity with French language. Looking 
at time needed to find employment, data with 
regard to Turkish immigrants are closer to those of 
French nationals than those of Tunisians. Turkish 
immigrants spend a shorter time to find a new job 
after becoming unemployed. It is very difficult to 
understand if origin countries and societies play a 
role in this issue. It is probable that these data are 
more connected with the main sectors of labour 
market in which the two communities are employed 
in France, as well as with the access and the action of 
migrant social networks in the country.
Looking at the role played by state actors in the 
countries of origins, the existing bilateral agreements 
between France and Tunisia (the 1963’s “Grandval” 
bilateral agreement, and the bilateral agreement 
on residence and work of 1988) appear as possible 
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explanatory factors for this difference in integration 
patterns between the two chosen communities, 
and particularly in the labour market. Looking at 
differences in the field of the educational attainment, 
Tunisia has again closer pattern to French natives, but 
it is difficult to assess the impact of origin countries. 
Regarding the share of population (aged 15-25) 
enrolled in formal education, both communities 
show a large distance from the French population 
pattern: only 30.4% of Tunisians, and 37.6% of 
Turkish immigrants are enrolled, vis-à-vis 64% of 
French natives. Looking at the population aged 25-35, 
Tunisians also show the highest share of population 
enrolled in formal education: 5.2% of Tunisians, 
1.5% ofTurks, and 2% of French natives. It is possible 
that this data has to be linked with the data on the 
number of international students coming from these 
two countries. In the period 2005-2012, the annual 
average number of Tunisian international students 
going to France was 10,842, while the number of 
Turkish students stood markedly lower at 2,324.
The fact that Tunisia has a wide use of French 
language, even if it is not an official language of the 
country, is important, as are the similarities in the 
education systems between Tunisia and France, and 
the larger diffusion of French schools in Tunisia.
In the field of access to citizenship, the difference 
between the two communities are larger. Only 27% 
of the Turkish immigrants residing in France have 
the French nationality, vis-à-vis 66% of Tunisians 
immigrants in the country. Nevertheless, during 
the last years the trend of Turkish and Tunisian 
immigrants granting French nationality has clearly 
become more equal. The share of naturalization 
between Turkish immigrants has grown substantially 
between 1999 and 2004-5, increasing from 15.2 % to 
25.7%, even is still lower than the share of Tunisians 
(40.2 % in 1999, growing to 45.2% in 2004-5)2.
The fact that Turkey allowed for dual nationality only 
after 1981 can explain the lower rate of nationality 
acquisition compared to the case of Tunisians. The 
Tunisian code of nationality of 1956, as well as its 
subsequent modifications, do not require the loss of 
Tunisian nationality upon the acquisition of another 
one. It is also possible that the very proactive Turkish 
policy to maintain link with the emigrants, as well as 
the trust of emigrants in origin countries and their 
institutions, has also played a role.
Concerning the role of civil society actors and 
immigrant organisation, in Turkey and Tunisia as 
well as in France, their activities towards immigrant 
integration have a less structural character and 
can appear to a first view as less relevant. That 
said, these activities, and particularly those carried 
on by immigrant organisations in the country of 
destination, have surely a strong impact in immigrant 
integration due to their proximity. The impact of 
these organisations, however, falls outside the scope 
of this study.
2 INED - Immigrés par pays de naissance en 1999, and INSEE - Immigrés et étrangers 2004-2005.
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